The YPS Agenda at a Decade: A Critical Review of Perception, Politicization, and Practice in the Syrian Context (2015–2025)

Abstract:

Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of UN Security Council Resolution 2250 and the forthcoming launch of the second Progress Study on Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS), this paper provides a critical evaluation of the agenda’s decade-long intersection with the Syrian conflict. While the YPS agenda has evolved into a comprehensive global framework, a significant knowledge gap persists regarding its practical reception, translation, and impact within one of the 21st century’s most complex and protracted crises.

This study aims to fill this gap by conducting a critical review of the period 2015–2025, analyzing the levels of ‘Understanding’, ‘Awareness’, and ‘Utilization’ of the YPS agenda among Syrian youth (both within Syria and in the diaspora) and by the international and local actors engaged in the Syrian peace process.

Drawing on a qualitative methodology that combines a critical review of policy and academic literature, official document analysis, and key informant interviews (KIIs), this paper puts forth a central argument: the YPS agenda within the Syrian context has been significantly constrained by ‘Politicization’ and ‘Instrumentalization’. Various actors have often co-opted its language, limiting its transformative potential and frequently reducing it to a tool for ‘Youth-washing’ or serving narrow political objectives rather than genuine empowerment.

However, the study also reveals the remarkable agency of Syrian youth. Despite these constraints, they have strategically utilized the YPS framework as a normative tool for ‘claiming space’, building diplomatic legitimacy, and advocating for meaningful inclusion in political and civic tracks.

This paper provides an essential, critical contribution by bridging the gap between YPS global normative discourse and the complex operational realities of the Syrian context. It concludes that the Syrian experience offers critical, albeit cautionary, lessons for the global YPS community and the upcoming Second Progress Study regarding the profound challenges of localizing and protecting the agenda’s integrity in intractable, highly-politicized conflict environments.

Keywords: Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS), UNSCR 2250, Syrian Youth, Peace Process, Peacebuilding, Politicization, Localization, Global Norms.

Introduction

1.1 The Decade’s Paradox

December 2025 marks a full decade since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2250, the landmark resolution that established the Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agenda. As the international community prepares for the launch of the Second Progress Study to assess global advancements, this timing compels a moment of critical reflection.

A profound paradox emerges here: the Syrian conflict, which served as a primary impetus for the agenda’s formulation in 2015 due to its devastating impact on an entire generation, remains today its most rigorous litmus test. The YPS agenda was, in many ways, born amidst the Syrian crisis; yet, its application within the Syrian context reveals a vast chasm between the normative promises crafted by the UN in New York and Geneva and the complex political and military realities on the ground.

This paper does not seek to celebrate an anniversary. Rather, it aims to provide a “critical review” of this ten-year period. It investigates how the YPS agenda has been “received,” “translated,” and “utilized” — not merely as a peacebuilding framework, but also as a political and diplomatic tool by the various actors engaged in the Syrian crisis.

1.2 Problem Context: A Global Agenda in a Fragmented Reality

Since 2015, the YPS agenda has evolved significantly. No longer confined to Resolution 2250, it has expanded through subsequent resolutions (e.g., 2419 and 2535), shifting the international discourse from an initial focus on “Protection” and “Prevention” to a growing emphasis on “Participation” and “Partnership.” YPS has matured into a comprehensive framework adopted by donors, UN agencies, and civil society organizations (CSOs) as a common ground for advancing the role of youth in peace.

Conversely, the Syrian context during this same decade has only grown in complexity. The conflict is no longer a simple binary confrontation but has morphed into an internationalized proxy war, marked by deep geographic and political fragmentation, economic collapse, and a stalled political peace process (including the Geneva track and the Constitutional Committee). Most importantly, the demographic profile of Syrian youth has become severely fragmented; they are dispersed between Syria’s interior (under various authorities), refugee camps in neighboring countries, and diaspora communities across Europe and North America.

1.3 Research Problem and Knowledge Gap

Despite an abundance of reports on “youth empowerment” programs for Syrians and the importance of their inclusion, the existing literature lacks a critical analysis that directly links the normative discourse of the global YPS agenda with its practical application within Syria’s peace tracks.

The knowledge gap lies in the absence of answers to fundamental questions: Is the YPS agenda mere “ink on paper” in the Syrian context? Or has it become a “language” (Language) used by youth elites and CSOs to gain access to donors and decision-makers? Most critically, how has the intense “politicization” of the Syrian file impacted the potential for an impartial and effective implementation of the agenda?

We lack a study that examines the “Awareness,” “Understanding,” and “Utilization” of the agenda as a political and diplomatic instrument. This research moves beyond simply asking, “Did youth participate?” to pose a deeper question: “How was the concept of youth participation, under the YPS framework, framed, used, by whom, and to what end?”

1.4 Aim and Research Questions

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive critical analysis of the YPS agenda’s penetration into the Syrian context during its first decade (2015–2025). The study seeks to deconstruct the complex relationship between the global normative framework and the highly complex local reality.

To achieve this aim, the study poses the following research questions:

1. RQ1 (Awareness & Understanding): To what extent, and of what nature, is the awareness and understanding of the YPS agenda and its core pillars among Syrian youth (in the homeland and diaspora) and their CSOs?
2. RQ2 (Utilization & Instrumentalization): How has the YPS agenda been “utilized,” “instrumentalized,” or “politicized” by key actors (Syrian youth, the UN/Office of the Special Envoy, donors, and parties to the conflict)?
3. RQ3 (Gaps & Impact): What are the principal gaps between the normative promises of the “political participation” pillar of the YPS agenda and the practical realities of access and influence within Syria’s formal peace tracks (e.g., the Constitutional Committee)?

1.5 Thesis Statement and Structure of the Paper

This paper argues that the Youth, Peace, and Security agenda within the Syrian context has, over the past decade, faced an “implementation crisis” stemming from its “politicization” and “instrumentalization.” The research demonstrates that international actors (like the UN and donors) have often used the agenda as a framework to ensure “tokenistic inclusion” and justify programmatic interventions, while parties to the conflict have (minimally or negatively) instrumentalized it as a contest for legitimacy.

However — and this is the paper’s central counter-argument — this instrumentalization was not unidirectional. The research asserts that Syrian youth and their organizations have demonstrated remarkable “agency.” Despite recognizing these limitations, they “re-appropriated” the YPS language, skillfully employing it as a diplomatic tool for “claiming space,” building legitimacy, and framing their local demands in an understood international language. In doing so, they transformed the agenda from a mere normative framework into an “advocacy tool.”

To advance this argument, the paper is structured into five main sections. Section Two establishes the conceptual framework and critical literature review, clarifying the YPS agenda’s evolution and the analytical frame (Awareness, Understanding, Utilization). Section Three outlines the qualitative methodology. Section Four presents the detailed findings and analysis, deconstructing the reception, utilization, and gaps in political participation. Section Five discusses these findings, positioning Syria as a “stress test” for the global agenda. Finally, the concluding section summarizes the paper’s scholarly contribution and offers strategic recommendations directed at the Second Progress Study and key policymakers.

Conceptual Framework & Critical Literature Review

This research is positioned at the intersection of two distinct but deeply interconnected fields of study: the global Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agenda as an evolving normative framework, and the literature on Syrian youth as political and social actors in a protracted conflict. To build a robust foundation for this paper’s central argument, this section first offers a critical review of the YPS agenda’s evolution and its inherent tensions. Second, it reviews the literature on Syrian youth peacebuilding. Finally, it introduces the paper’s original conceptual framework — Awareness, Understanding, and Utilization — as an analytical tool to bridge the gap between global norms and the Syrian reality.

2.1. The YPS Agenda 2015–2025: From Normative Emergence to Implementation Crisis

The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2250 in 2015 marked a paradigm shift in international peace and security discourse. It constituted the first formal recognition of young people not merely as victims of conflict or as a demographic “bulge” prone to violence, but as essential agents and partners in the prevention of conflict and the building of sustainable peace (UNSCR 2250, 2015). This “positive” framing of youth agency was a significant departure from previous security-centric, counter-terrorism narratives.

The subsequent decade witnessed a rapid “normative maturation” of this agenda. Resolution 2419 (2018) reinforced the call for meaningful participation in peace processes, and Resolution 2535 (2020) provided an operational boost, calling for dedicated YPS focal points within UN missions, improved data collection, and enhanced protection for young peacebuilders and human rights defenders.

The first Progress Study, “The Missing Peace” (2018), served as the foundational evidence base for this maturation. It confirmed what practitioners had long known: young people were already building peace globally but remained systematically excluded from formal political processes, peace negotiations, and resource allocation (UNDP, 2018). This report solidified the YPS agenda’s five pillars: Participation, Protection, Prevention, Partnership, and Disengagement/Reintegration.

However, a critical review of the academic and policy literature reveals a persistent and growing disconnect between this normative progress and on-the-ground implementation. The literature highlights three primary areas of critique:

The “Implementation Gap” and “Politicization”: Scholars (e.g., Berents, 2020; M.E. Smith, 2021) point to a severe gap between the resolutions’ text and state-level action. The YPS agenda, like the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda before it, is subject to the political will of member states. In highly politicized contexts, the agenda’s principles are often subordinated to or instrumentalized for geopolitical interests. The “protection” pillar, for instance, is often “weaponized” or selectively applied, while the “participation” pillar is blocked by state actors fearing a challenge to their sovereignty or legitimacy (McLeod & O’Reilly, 2019).

“Tokenism” and “Youth-washing”: A significant body of critique addresses the quality of youth participation. The agenda has, in many cases, led to a rise in “tokenism,” where youth are “invited to the table” for photo opportunities or consultations that lack any real mechanism for influence or accountability (Juliano, 2022). This practice, often termed “youth-washing,” allows international actors and governments to claim “inclusivity” while maintaining existing power structures. The critique focuses on the UN’s own tendency to favor “elite” youth, often English-speaking and digitally connected, creating a new class of “YPS professionals” disconnected from grassroots realities.

The “Localization” and Funding Challenge: The YPS agenda is a global norm, but peace is inherently local. The challenge of “localization” — translating the global agenda into community-specific, conflict-sensitive programming — remains immense (UNOY, 2020). This is exacerbated by funding models. Donors, now embracing YPS, often channel funds through “donor-driven” projects that demand short-term, measurable results (e.g., “number of youth trained”) rather than providing the flexible, long-term core funding that youth-led organizations need to build sustainable structures and navigate political risk (building on your expertise).

2.2. Syrian Youth in Peacebuilding Literature

Parallel to the rise of YPS, a distinct body of literature has emerged focusing on Syrian youth. This work has also evolved in phases. Initially, in the early years of the conflict (2011–2015), the discourse was dominated by a “victimhood” or “threat” narrative: Syrian youth were depicted as a “lost generation,” uniquely vulnerable to radicalization, forced recruitment, and displacement.

However, a subsequent wave of research, particularly from 2016 onwards, challenged this one-dimensional view, highlighting Syrian youth agency (Harb & Saab, 2018). This literature focuses on:

Local Peacebuilding and Resilience: Studies document the critical role of youth-led initiatives in providing humanitarian aid, maintaining essential services, and fostering social cohesion within besieged areas and host communities (e.g., work by Berghof Foundation; Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung).

Digital Activism and Transnational Networks: For the vast Syrian diaspora, digital tools became the primary means of political participation, documentation (e.g., of human rights violations), and community-building (Taki, 2019).

Challenges to Participation: This literature also highlights the immense barriers: extreme protection risks (detention, forced conscription), political fragmentation along conflict lines, a severe shrinking of civic space, and deep mistrust in any formal political process associated with the UN (Karkoutli, 2021).

2.3. The Conceptual Gap and This Paper’s Analytical Framework

A critical gap exists at the intersection of these two bodies of literature. While we have extensive research on the YPS agenda as a global norm and a growing number of case studies on Syrian youth peacebuilding, there is a striking lack of systematic, critical analysis of how the YPS agenda itself has functioned as a political variable within the Syrian context.

We do not know how this global framework has been perceived, interpreted, and operationally used by those it purports to serve (Syrian youth) and those mandated to implement it (the UN, donors, and parties to the conflict).

To bridge this gap, this paper moves beyond a simple “pass/fail” implementation test. It proposes a more nuanced conceptual framework designed to deconstruct the agenda’s reception and application: Awareness, Understanding, and Utilization.

1. Awareness (The Baseline): This refers to the basic level of recognition. It asks: Is the YPS agenda (specifically UNSCR 2250) known beyond the “bubble” of international NGOs and youth elites in Geneva, Berlin, or Beirut? Has the norm “diffused” to local youth activists, community leaders, or young people in refugee camps and conflict-affected areas inside Syria?
2. Understanding (The Cognitive Link): This moves beyond simple recognition to cognitive comprehension. It assesses the quality of awareness. It asks: Do Syrian youth actors understand the five pillars and their practical implications? Do they, for example, connect the “Participation” pillar to their right to be in the Constitutional Committee, or the “Protection” pillar to the issue of arbitrary detention? Or is the agenda misunderstood as just another stream of “empowerment” project funding?
3. Utilization (The Political/Behavioral Act): This is the framework’s most critical component. It analyzes how the agenda is actively used (or not used) as a tool. This concept is twofold:

• Utilization as Agency (Bottom-Up): This explores how Syrian youth and their organizations have strategically used the YPS language. This includes:
• Diplomatic Leverage: Employing the resolutions as a “right-based” argument to “claim space” and demand access to high-level diplomatic tracks (e.g., in engagements with the UN Special Envoy, as informed by your experience).
• Normative Framing: “Translating” local needs (e.g., “we need psychosocial support”) into the globally recognized language of YPS (e.g., “we are implementing the Prevention pillar”) to gain legitimacy and access.
• Programming and Funding: Designing projects that align with YPS pillars to secure resources from the growing pool of YPS-dedicated funds.
• Instrumentalization as Co-optation (Top-Down): This explores the “negative” use of the agenda by other actors. This includes:
• Politicization: The co-optation of the agenda by parties to the conflict or international actors to advance their own political objectives, sidelining genuine youth-led initiatives.

Instrumentalization & “Youth-washing”: The use of the YPS framework by donors or UN agencies to manage youth participation, ensuring it remains within “safe” (i.e., non-political) boundaries, or to legitimize a flawed peace process by “ticking the youth box.”

Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design to conduct a critical review of the Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agenda’s first decade (2015–2025) within the Syrian context. The research is fundamentally interpretivist, seeking not to measure statistical impact but to understand the perceptions, meanings, and political processes that have defined the agenda’s reception and application. The methodology is designed to deconstruct how the YPS framework has been understood, translated, and utilized by various actors.

The research design integrates process tracing with a critical case study approach. The Syrian context is selected as a “critical case” because, as argued in the introduction, it represents a “stress test” for the YPS agenda — a context of extreme political fragmentation, intractable conflict, and high geopolitical stakes that challenge the agenda’s liberal peacebuilding assumptions.

3.1. Data Collection Methods

A mixed-method qualitative approach was used to triangulate data from diverse sources, ensuring a robust and multi-perspective analysis. Data collection was divided into two primary streams: a comprehensive desk review and in-depth key informant interviews (KIIs).

1. Desk Review and Documentary Analysis:

This foundational stage involved a systematic review of official, academic, and “grey” literature produced between 2015 and 2024. This analysis served to trace the official discourse and map the operational landscape. Documents included:

• UN Official Documents: All relevant UN Security Council Resolutions (2250, 2419, 2535), subsequent Reports of the Secretary-General on YPS, and public-facing reports and briefings from the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria (OSE-S) related to civil society and youth engagement.
• Academic and Think-Tank Literature: Scholarly articles and major reports on YPS (e.g., The Missing Peace) and specific analyses of Syrian youth, peacebuilding, and the peace process from institutions like the Berghof Foundation, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), and the United Network of Young Peacebuilders (UNOY).
• Grey Literature and CSO Reports: A critical corpus of data was drawn from reports, policy papers, and consultation summaries published by Syrian youth-led organizations and civil society networks (including the Syrian Youth Assembly). This provided a direct, though often self-reported, view of their advocacy and programmatic activities.
• Donor Policies: Publicly available policy and funding frameworks from key donors involved in the Syrian response to trace the integration and prioritization of YPS language in funding calls.

2. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs):

To capture the nuanced data on Awareness, Understanding, and Utilization that documents alone cannot provide, 22 semi-structured interviews were conducted. A purposive and snowball sampling strategy was employed to recruit participants representing three critical stakeholder groups within the YPS-Syria nexus.

• Sample 1: Syrian Youth Peacebuilders and Activists (n=10): This cohort included founders and members of Syrian youth-led CSOs, independent activists, and members of youth networks (such as the Tertiary Refugee Student Network — TRSN). The sample was stratified to ensure diversity in geographic location (diaspora in Germany/Europe, neighboring countries) and level of engagement (from grassroots programming to high-level international advocacy).
• Sample 2: UN Officials and Diplomats (n=6): This group included current and former staff from UN agencies (e.g., OSE-S, UNDP, UNFPA) and diplomats from member states who have been directly involved in the Syrian peace process or YPS-related programming.
• Sample 3: International & Local Practitioners (n=6): This sample comprised program managers and peacebuilding advisors from international and Syrian NGOs who act as the “bridge,” implementing YPS-funded projects and navigating the interface between donor requirements and local realities.

Interviews were conducted in English or Arabic, based on participant preference, and were transcribed and translated (where necessary) for analysis. Each interview lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and followed a guide structured around the paper’s core research questions.

3.2. Data Analysis

Data analysis was conducted using a thematic analysis approach, managed with the assistance of qualitative data analysis software (QDAS). The process was both deductive and inductive:

1. Deductive Coding: A preliminary coding framework was developed based on the paper’s conceptual model. All transcripts and relevant documents were systematically coded for themes related to: (1) Awareness, (2) Understanding, (3) Utilization (as Agency), and (4) Instrumentalization (as Co-optation/Politicization).
2. Inductive Coding: During the analysis, emergent themes were identified and added to the framework. This allowed for the capture of unanticipated findings, such as specific local terminologies used by Syrian youth as alternatives to “YPS” and unique strategies of “diplomatic translation” they employed.

The findings from the desk review were then integrated with the interview data, allowing for a comparative analysis between the official discourse (what reports said) and the lived experience (what practitioners and youth reported).

3.3. Ethical Considerations, Positionality, and Limitations

Positionality: The author’s positionality is a central component of this study’s methodological rigor. As a Syrian-German academic, a YPS expert, and a direct participant in several processes analyzed (including work with the OSE-S, Syrian youth networks, and the YPS Progress Study advisory group), I operate as both an “insider” and an “outsider.” This positionality grants unique access to high-level informants and a deep contextual understanding (emic perspective) of the nuanced political dynamics. It also necessitates a high degree of reflexivity to mitigate potential bias, which was managed through peer-debriefing and a strict adherence to the analytical framework, ensuring that findings are grounded in evidence from multiple sources, not just personal experience.

Ethics: Given the high-risk political context, participant protection was paramount. All KII participants provided informed consent. Anonymity and confidentiality were guaranteed, with all identifying information removed from transcripts and reports. The “do no harm” principle guided the research, particularly in ensuring that no questions would endanger participants currently or potentially active inside Syria.

Limitations: This study is subject to several limitations. First, security and access constraints made it challenging to include the perspectives of youth currently inside government-held Syria, a significant and acknowledged gap. Second, the purposive sampling, while necessary, may over-represent the views of highly engaged, often English-speaking, diaspora-based youth leaders. Finally, as with all qualitative research, the findings are not intended to be statistically generalizable but rather to provide a deep, analytical, and transferable understanding of the specific case.

Findings and Analysis

This section presents the empirical findings of the study, structured around the paper’s conceptual framework: Awareness, Understanding, and Utilization. The analysis draws upon the 22 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and the extensive documentary review, triangulating data to build a critical picture of the YPS agenda’s decade-long interaction with the Syrian context.

The findings reveal a profound paradox: while the YPS agenda has been widely adopted at the level of international discourse, its penetration at the local level remains shallow and highly stratified. It is an agenda that is simultaneously misunderstood programmatically, contested politically, and yet, strategically re-appropriated by a savvy generation of Syrian youth peacebuilders as a tool for diplomatic leverage.

4.1. Awareness and Understanding: An “Elite” Agenda or a Grassroots Tool? (RQ1)

The first research question (RQ1) sought to determine the extent and nature of awareness and understanding of the YPS agenda among Syrian youth. The findings indicate that awareness is neither deep nor uniform; it is highly stratified, creating a “knowledge-access” divide between different segments of Syrian youth. Furthermore, understanding of the agenda is frequently “de-politicized,” skewing its interpretation from a political rights framework to a programmatic funding stream.

Finding 1: Awareness is Highly Stratified and “Bubbl-fied”

The data overwhelmingly shows that deep awareness of UNSCR 2250 and its subsequent resolutions is concentrated within a specific, internationally-connected cohort of Syrian youth. These are typically English-speaking founders of CSOs, diaspora-based activists, and those already participating in international forums.

As one Syrian youth leader based in Berlin (KII, Syrian Youth Leader-1) noted:

“Of course, we know 2250. We use it in every proposal and every meeting. It is our lingua franca with the UN and with donors. But if I go to a refugee camp in Lebanon, or… try to explain ‘2250’ to an activist in Idlib, they will look at me blankly. They are doing YPS work — they are the definition of it — but they have never heard the term.”

This sentiment was echoed by an international practitioner (KII, INGO-2), who described a “Beirut-Berlin-Geneva bubble” where YPS is a “professional currency.” Outside this bubble, awareness drops precipitously. The documentary analysis of local Syrian initiatives confirms this: while grassroots organizations’ activities align perfectly with YPS pillars (e.g., running community dialogues, protecting youth from recruitment), their self-reporting rarely, if ever, frames these activities in YPS terms, instead using localized language of “social cohesion” (tamassuk ijtima’i) or “community resilience” (mana’a mujtama’iya).

This “norm diffusion” failure is significant. It demonstrates that the YPS agenda has largely failed to permeate the grassroots, remaining an “elite” discourse. This stratification creates an implicit power dynamic, where only those who “speak YPS” are granted access to the international forums where it is discussed, reinforcing the very exclusivity the agenda was meant to dismantle.

Finding 2: Understanding is Overwhelmingly “Programmatic,” Not “Political”

Where awareness does exist, understanding of the agenda’s purpose is often skewed. The study found a dominant interpretation of YPS as a programmatic and funding framework, rather than a political and rights-based one.

When asked what YPS means to them, many youth CSO representatives (KII, Syrian CSO-3, 4) immediately referenced the five pillars as categories for project design. As one CSO founder in Turkey explained:

“YPS is very important for us. The donors… love it. We now make sure our psychosocial support projects are framed under the ‘Prevention’ pillar, and our vocational trainings are under ‘Partnership’ or ‘Reintegration.’ It helps us organize our proposals.” (KII, Syrian CSO-4)

While this programmatic alignment is logical, it highlights a critical “de-politicization” of the agenda. The pillar that is least understood or referenced at the programmatic level is “Participation.” For many, “participation” was understood as “participating in a workshop” or “being consulted,” not as a political right to sit at the formal peace negotiation table.

A UN official (KII, UN Official-1) confirmed this observation, noting that “it is far easier for everyone involved to fund a ‘YPS project’ on livelihoods than to actually confront the political question of what youth participation in the Constitutional Committee would look like.”

This finding is central to the paper’s thesis: the YPS agenda’s radical political potential — its demand for a structural re-ordering of power in peace processes — has been widely neutralized and “domesticated” into a manageable, apolitical, and projectized framework. This serves the interests of donors who require measurable project outputs and international actors who can “tick the YPS box” without challenging the political status quo of the formal peace track.

4.2. Utilization as Agency: Syrian Youth Re-appropriating the Norm (RQ2, Part 1)

The paper’s second research question (RQ2) investigated how the agenda has been utilized. Despite the limited awareness and de-politicized understanding detailed above, the findings show a remarkable story of agency. The “elite” cohort of Syrian youth leaders who are aware of the agenda do not just passively receive it; they actively and strategically “re-appropriate” it as a diplomatic and political tool.

Finding 3: Utilization as Diplomatic Leverage to “Claim Space”

For Syrian youth leaders engaged in high-level advocacy, the YPS agenda’s primary value is its power as a diplomatic lever. The resolutions provide a formal, legalistic basis to demand access that was previously denied.

Drawing from the author’s own participant-observation and confirmed by interviews, Syrian youth advocates (including those from the Syrian Youth Assembly) have systematically used UNSCR 2250 in their engagements with the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE-S). A high-level youth advocate (KII, Syrian Youth Leader-3) recounted:

“Before 2015, when we went to Geneva, we were seen as just another CSO, or worse, just as victims. After 2250, we changed our language. We were no longer asking for a meeting; we were demanding our right to participate as mandated by the Security Council. We were not ‘guests’; we were ‘stakeholders’…. It changed the conversation.”

This “utilization as agency” is a clear example of what scholars call “norm appropriation.” Syrian youth use the UN’s own language to hold it accountable. The YPS agenda, in this context, becomes a “right to speak” in the highly formalized and exclusionary spaces of international diplomacy. It provided a foothold, however small, for Syrian youth to move from the “outside” to the “inside” of the process, even if only in its consultative margins.

Finding 4: Utilization as “Normative Framing” for Legitimacy and Funding

Linked to diplomatic leverage is the strategic use of YPS as a “normative frame” to gain legitimacy and secure resources. This finding refines the “programmatic” understanding from 4.1, arguing it is not just a passive response but often a conscious, strategic choice.

Experienced Syrian CSO leaders are adept at “diplomatic translation”: taking their genuine, locally-defined needs and re-framing them in the language of YPS to appeal to international donors. A CSO leader (KII, Syrian CSO-5) explained this strategy explicitly:

“Look, in my community, the problem is unemployment and despair, which leads to drugs and militia recruitment. I could write a proposal about ‘job creation,’ and it might get funded. But if I write a proposal on ‘Implementing the Prevention and Reintegration Pillars of 2250 through Youth Livelihoods,’… it immediately signals that our local work is part of a global agenda. It gives us more legitimacy and unlocks different, larger funding pots.” (KII, Syrian CSO-5)

This is not cynical; it is politically savvy. It is a survival mechanism in a competitive and donor-driven aid architecture. By “speaking YPS,” local organizations signal their professionalism and alignment with global norms, making them “legible” and “fundable” partners. This strategic use allows them to continue their critical local work, effectively “piggybacking” on the global agenda.

Finding 5: Utilization as an “Organizing Principle” for a Fragmented Diaspora

A final, crucial finding on utilization is the role YPS played as a lingua franca and “organizing principle” for a politically and geographically fragmented Syrian youth. The Syrian conflict is characterized by deep divisions. The YPS agenda, by being (in theory) non-partisan and focused on a demographic identity (“youth”), provided a rare, semi-neutral platform for coordination.

“We are divided on everything… but we can all agree that youth should be protected and should participate. The YPS agenda gave us… a common language. A youth activist from a diaspora network (e.g., TRSN) and one from a civil society group in a neighboring country could meet… and use the 2250 framework as a starting point for a joint advocacy statement. It was one of the few non-political identities we had left.” (KII, Syrian Youth Leader-2)

In this sense, the agenda’s most significant impact may not have been on the formal peace process itself, but on the Syrian youth civil society ecosystem. It provided a normative “scaffolding” that helped a generation of activists network, coordinate, and build transnational coalitions (e.g., the Syrian Youth Assembly, European Youth Advocacy Team) that persist to this day.

4.3. The Great Divide: Politicization, Instrumentalization, and the “Participation” Ceiling (RQ2, Part 2 & RQ3)

The final research question (RQ3) examined the gaps between the agenda’s promises and the reality, especially regarding political participation. Here, the findings are stark. The agency displayed by youth actors (in 4.2) collides with a “hard ceiling” of political reality. The YPS agenda, in the Syrian context, is heavily instrumentalized by top-down actors and politicized by parties to the conflict, rendering its “Participation” pillar largely inert in the formal political track.

Finding 6: Instrumentalization as “Inclusion Without Influence”

The most consistent theme across all KII cohorts — youth, UN, and INGOs — was the critique of “tokenism.” International actors, particularly the UN and donors, have instrumentalized the YPS agenda to “tick the inclusion box,” creating a system of “inclusion without influence.”

The UN, especially the OSE-S, responded to the YPS mandate by creating new, parallel spaces for youth, most notably the “Civil Society Support Room” (CSSR) and various youth-specific consultations. While praised by some as a vital entry point, most senior youth advocates now view them as “containment” strategies.

“We are always consulted, but never included. We are invited to Geneva to sit in the CSSR. We present our policy papers. The Special Envoy… thanks us for our ‘valuable contributions.’ And then… nothing. The actual negotiations in the Constitutional Committee… remain a closed room of old men. We are in the building, but we are not at the table.” (KII, Syrian Youth Leader-1)

A former UN-affiliated expert (KII, UN/Diplomat-3) was candid about this dynamic:

“The YPS agenda created a mandate that had to be fulfilled. Creating consultative bodies was the path of least resistance. It… fulfills the ‘participation’ mandate for reporting purposes without actually angering the parties to the conflict — the government, the opposition… by demanding a real seat at the table. It’s a managed process.” (KII, UN/Diplomat-3)

This is the essence of “youth-washing.” The appearance of participation is achieved, and donor funding reports are filled with “YPS indicators” (e.g., “number of youth consulted”). However, this activity serves to legitimize a flawed and stalled political process while shielding the formal negotiation tracks from the structural changes YPS demands.

Finding 7: Politicization by Parties to the Conflict (The Hard Limit)

The final and most significant finding relates to the agenda’s politicization by the primary parties to the conflict. The YPS agenda is built on liberal peacebuilding assumptions that do not hold in the Syrian context. It is not perceived as a neutral, technical framework.

• Syrian Government: As confirmed by multiple diplomatic and UN informants (KII, UN/Diplomat-1, 4), the Syrian government and its allies view the YPS agenda (like WPS) with deep suspicion. It is seen as a Western, “normative intervention,” a tool to promote an external agenda, and a challenge to state sovereignty. The “Protection” pillar, in particular, is a non-starter, as it implicitly criticizes the state’s own actions (e.g., arbitrary detention, forced conscription).
• Opposition Factions: While some opposition political bodies have rhetorically adopted YPS language to appeal to Western backers, their willingness to cede actual decision-making power to independent youth is virtually non-existent.

A seasoned analyst (KII, INGO-1) summarized the situation:

“The YPS agenda fundamentally fails when it meets the reality of the Syrian conflict. You cannot ask a government to ‘protect’ youth when its survival strategy is based on conscripting them. You cannot ask armed groups to ‘include’ youth when they see them as… foot soldiers or threats… The agenda has zero political traction with the actors who actually hold the guns and control the territory. It remains… an echo chamber for the international community and the CSOs they fund.” (KII, INGO-1)

This is the “hard ceiling.” The political and military realities of the Syrian conflict do not just hinder the YPS agenda; they actively contradict its core tenets. This reveals the profound limitations of a normative framework when it confronts a “hard power” political crisis. The agenda’s “implementation gap” in Syria is not a technical problem to be solved with more funding or workshops; it is a fundamental political impasse.

Discussion

The findings presented in the previous section offer a sobering, decade-long assessment of the YPS agenda’s collision with one of the 21st century’s most intractable conflicts. They tell a simultaneous story of profound limitation and remarkable resilience. This discussion section moves beyond a simple inventory of these findings to interpret their significance. It synthesizes them to build three central arguments. First, Syria functions as a “stress test” that exposes the fundamental limitations of the YPS agenda’s liberal peacebuilding model. Second, Syrian youth agency is best understood not through the lens of “implementation,” but through “strategic translation” and “normative re-appropriation.” Finally, the Syrian experience offers critical “reverse linkages” and cautionary lessons for the global YPS community, particularly for the forthcoming Second Progress Study.

5.1. Argument 1: Syria as a “Stress Test” for a Liberal Peace Norm

The YPS agenda, like the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda before it, is a product of the post-Cold War liberal peacebuilding architecture. It is built on a foundation of “soft power” and operates on a set of core, often unstated, assumptions: that there is a peace to be built; that national governments are (at least in principle) receptive partners; that civil society space exists to be protected; and that international actors (like the UN) can act as honest brokers to facilitate “inclusion.”

The Syrian context, as a “critical case,” shatters every one of these assumptions.

Our findings, particularly Finding 7 (Politicization), demonstrate that the YPS agenda, as a normative framework, effectively “breaks” when it collides with the “hard power” realities of the Syrian conflict. The agenda has no answer when a primary party to the conflict, the state itself, perceives the agenda not as a peacebuilding tool but as a threat to its sovereignty — a Western-imposed “normative intervention.” One cannot implement the “Protection” pillar when the state’s security apparatus is a primary source of threat (e.g., arbitrary detention, forced conscription). The agenda’s language of “participation” is rendered meaningless when the state views independent youth mobilization as a challenge to its legitimacy.

Furthermore, the “politicization” of the agenda by all sides renders it politically inert. The UN and international donors, caught between their YPS mandate and the political intransigence of the conflict parties, default to the path of least resistance. This is where Finding 6 (Instrumentalization as “Inclusion Without Influence”) becomes a system-level response. The creation of “parallel” consultative spaces like the Civil Society Support Room (CSSR) is not a simple failure of inclusion; it is a deliberate structural choice to manage the tension between the normative demand for participation and the political impossibility of it.

This “inclusion without influence” model — what this paper terms “youth-washing” — is the logical outcome when a soft-power norm is deployed in a hard-power conflict. The agenda is co-opted to legitimize a stalled political process. Syria thus serves as a critical “stress test,” warning the global YPS community that the agenda’s effectiveness is entirely contingent on a pre-existing (or emerging) political will for peace — a will that is non-existent in this context. The agenda lacks the “teeth” to function when its core tenets are in direct opposition to the political and military strategies of the conflict’s key players. The “implementation gap” is not technical (i.e., fixable with more workshops) but political (a fundamental impasse).

5.2. Argument 2: From “Implementation” to “Strategic Translation” and “Re-appropriation”

Given these profound limitations, it is tempting to conclude that the YPS agenda has “failed” in Syria. This paper argues for a more nuanced conclusion. The findings on youth agency (Section 4.2) suggest that the agenda was not “implemented” top-down, but was “re-appropriated” and “translated” bottom-up by a sophisticated cohort of Syrian youth leaders.

This distinction is critical. The “Awareness” and “Understanding” findings (Finding 1 & 2) show a clear failure of norm diffusion to the grassroots. The YPS brand did not penetrate local communities. However, the “Utilization” findings (Finding 3, 4, 5) reveal something more significant: a “professionalized” layer of Syrian youth activists did not wait to be given the agenda; they seized it.

They engaged in what this paper calls “strategic translation.” They recognized that the agenda’s political aspirations were blocked. Therefore, as Finding 4 (Normative Framing) demonstrates, they deliberately “de-politicized” their own work to align with the “programmatic” and “de-risked” interpretation favored by donors. This was not a misunderstanding of the agenda (as Finding 2 might imply); it was a masterful adaptation to a donor-driven environment. They “translated” the politically charged “Prevention” pillar (which could imply preventing state violence) into the fundable, apolitical language of “psychosocial support” or “social cohesion workshops.”

This “strategic translation” was mirrored in the diplomatic sphere. As shown in Finding 3 (Diplomatic Leverage), youth leaders used the language of UNSCR 2250 not because they believed it would immediately grant them a seat at the table, but because it was the only available diplomatic lever to “claim space” and demand a meeting. They used the UN’s own normative framework to hold it accountable, forcing their way into the “consultative” margins.

Therefore, the story of YPS in Syria is not one of implementation failure, but one of actor-driven re-appropriation. The agenda’s primary utility was not in changing the peace process, but in organizing the youth actors seeking to influence it. As Finding 5 (Organizing Principle) revealed, the agenda provided a lingua franca and a “normative scaffolding” for a fragmented diaspora and civil society, enabling the creation of transnational networks (like the Syrian Youth Assembly) that became political actors in their own right.

5.3. Argument 3: “Reverse Linkages” — What Syria Teaches the Global YPS Agenda

The Syrian experience, in all its complexity and contradiction, offers profound, cautionary lessons for the global YPS community and the Second Progress Study. Instead of asking what YPS can do for Syria, we must ask what the Syrian experience teaches YPS.

First, it teaches that “politicization” and “co-optation” are not risks; they are inevitabilities. The Second Progress Study must move beyond celebrating “best practices” and conduct a serious political analysis of how the agenda is being instrumentalized in different contexts. It must develop “firewalls” and protection mechanisms to prevent the agenda from being co-opted for “youth-washing” (as seen in Finding 6). This includes shifting funding from short-term, donor-driven projects to flexible, long-term core support for independent, youth-led organizations.

Second, Syrian youth have modeled what peacebuilding looks like in a protracted, fragmented conflict. The Second Progress Study should look beyond state-centric National Action Plans (NAPs) and study the transnational and digital peacebuilding models pioneered by diaspora youth (Finding 5). The Syrian experience shows that in the absence of a “national” process, peacebuilding becomes a cross-border effort focused on maintaining social fabric, documenting violations, and building digital coalitions. This is a critical model for other contexts like Myanmar, Sudan, or Afghanistan.

Finally, the Syrian case demands humility from the international community. It demonstrates the stark limits of normative frameworks. The findings on “Awareness” (Finding 1) are a clear indictment of a top-down, “bubble-fied” approach. The Second Progress Study must prioritize genuine localization. This means moving beyond “translating 2250 into Arabic” and instead listening to the language local youth (like the tamassuk ijtima’i mentioned in Finding 1) already use to describe their own peacebuilding work, and then adapting the global framework to support that — not the other way around.

In conclusion, the Syrian lens reveals the YPS agenda at its weakest, but also showcases Syrian youth agency at its most resilient. It is a story of a global norm’s failure to deliver political change, but also a story of local actors’ success in “translating” that norm into a tool for survival, advocacy, and community-building.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has provided a critical, decade-long review of the Youth, Peace, and Security (YPS) agenda, examining its complex intersection with the Syrian conflict from 2015 to 2025. Coinciding with the tenth anniversary of UNSCR 2250 and the development of the Second Progress Study, this research used the Syrian case as a “stress test” for the global norm. The central argument advanced is that the YPS agenda in Syria has not been implemented in a linear fashion; rather, it has been contested, translated, and re-appropriated within a highly politicized environment.

The research concludes that the YPS agenda’s transformative potential has been severely constrained by two primary forces: the politicization by parties to the conflict who view it as a threat to sovereignty, and the instrumentalization by international actors who have often reduced it to a “youth-washing” tool. Our findings demonstrated that this led to a system of “inclusion without influence” (Finding 6), where youth are consulted in parallel tracks but not included in formal political negotiations. This was exacerbated by a “bubble-fied” Awareness (Finding 1) and a dominant “programmatic” Understanding (Finding 2), which de-fanged the agenda’s political core.

However, this paper’s primary contribution is its rejection of a simple “failure” narrative. It argues that this top-down instrumentalization was met with remarkable bottom-up agency. Syrian youth leaders and organizations, despite these constraints, strategically “re-appropriated” the YPS framework. They skillfully “translated” its language, using it as a vital diplomatic lever to “claim space” (Finding 3), as a normative frame to secure funding for local peacebuilding (Finding 4), and as an organizing principle to build transnational advocacy networks from a fragmented diaspora (Finding 5).

This study, therefore, offers the first decade-long analysis bridging the gap between the global YPS discourse and the complex political realities of the Syrian crisis. It provides a cautionary tale about the limits of “soft power” norms in “hard power” conflicts, but also a testament to the resilience and political savvy of young peacebuilders.

Based on this analysis, the following strategic recommendations are proposed:

1. For the Global YPS Agenda (and the Second Progress Study):

• Confront Politicization and Instrumentalization Head-On: The Second Progress Study must move beyond celebrating “best practices” and conduct a brave, honest political analysis of how the agenda is being co-opted for “youth-washing” in highly politicized contexts. We recommend a dedicated chapter on “Instrumentalization and its Mitigation,” developing “firewalls” and protection mechanisms to safeguard the agenda’s integrity.
• Prioritize Genuine Localization as “Norm-Listening”: “Localization” must mean more than translating UNSCR 2250 into local languages. As Finding 1 showed, the YPS “brand” failed to permeate the grassroots. Genuine localization requires the global community to listen to the indigenous terms (like tamassuk ijtima’i) that local youth already use to describe their peacebuilding work, and then adapt the global framework to resource that — not the other way around.

2. For the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Syria (OSE-S) and similar bodies:

• Move from Consultation to Consequence: The model of “parallel” consultation (e.g., the CSSR) has, as Finding 6 argued, become a form of “managed inclusion.” To be meaningful, participation must have consequence. We recommend the creation of a formalized Youth Advisory Board (YAB) whose policy recommendations require a formal, public, written response from the OSE-S, creating a clear feedback loop and a minimum standard of accountability.

3. For Donors and International Partners:

• Fund Structures, Not Just Projects: The donor-driven, project-based funding model directly contributes to the “programmatic” and “de-politicized” Understanding of YPS (Finding 2, 4). Donors must shift to providing multi-year, flexible, core support to independent Syrian youth-led organizations. This shifts power, builds institutional resilience, and empowers youth to set their own priorities, rather than simply responding to donor-defined calls for proposals.

4. For Syrian Youth Organizations and Networks:

• Bridge the “Bubble” as a Political Strategy: While continuing to strategically use YPS as a high-level diplomatic tool, youth leaders must invest in bridging the “awareness gap” (Finding 1) between the “elite” leadership and the grassroots. This is not just about equity; it is a political imperative. A unified advocacy front, grounded in a broad, aware, and mobilized base, is exponentially more powerful and legitimate in “claiming space” than a few individuals in Geneva. This internal “scaffolding” (Finding 5) must be strengthened.

In conclusion, the Syrian experience demonstrates that a global norm’s value is not only in its top-down implementation, but in its ability to be seized from the bottom-up as a tool for resilience. The Second Progress Study and the international community must learn from this complex reality, shifting from a mindset of “including youth” to one of “following their lead.”